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## REPUBLICANISM AND THE FORMATION OF KARL MARX'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

Bruno Leipold

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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For my grandparents,

&

Brigitte Leipold, *Tante und Genossin.*

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# ILLUSTRATIONS

# NOTE ON THE TEXT

FOR NON-ENGLISH PRIMARY sources I have tried to cite both the original and an English translation. As I have made my own translations, they do not necessarily correspond to the cited English text. I have kept original spelling in citations and titles of works. For Marx and Engels's works, I cite both the *Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe* (*MEGA*) and the *Marx Engels Collected Works* (*MECW*). For the diminishing number of texts not yet published in the *MEGA*, I revert to the older standard German edition, the *Marx Engels Werke* (*MEW*). I have separated references to the original text (e.g., *MEGA* or *MEW*) and the translation (e.g., *MECW*) by a forward slash. Parts of the *MEGA* are freely available at https://megadigital.bbaw.de; the entire *MECW* can be accessed at https://lwbooks.co.uk/marx-engels-collected-works/read-and-search-online, and digital copies of the *MEW* can be freely borrowed from archive.org.

For volume 1 of Marx's *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), I cite the final German version Marx brought to publication, the 1872–73 second edition (*MEGA* II.6), noting when it differs significantly from the 1867 first German edition (*MEGA* II.5), the 1872–75 French translation supervised by Marx (*MEGA* II.7) or the 1883 third (*MEGA* II.8) and 1890 fourth (*MEGA* II.10) German editions produced by Engels. For the text once known as Marx and Engels's *Die deutsche Ideologie* (*The German Ideology*), I cite the individual manuscripts from which that work was editorially constructed. This reflects the recent consensus (embodied in the *MEGA* I.5 edition) that these unpublished 1845–47 writings were intended as articles for a quarterly journal project rather than a single coherent book.

I have tried to keep as much reference information in the footnotes as possible, so that readers are not forced to flip back and forth between the text and a bibliography. For a few frequently cited texts, I use the following abbreviations:

*BdK. Bund der Kommunisten: Dokumente und Materialien.* 3 volumes. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1970–84.

*Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter.* Arnold Ruge, *Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter aus den Jahren 1825–1880*. Edited by Paul Nerrlich. 2 volumes. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1886.

*English Republic. The English Republic.* Edited by William James Linton, 4 volumes. London: J. Watson, volumes 1–2, 1851–53, and Brantwood: Linton, volumes 3–4, 1854–55.

*MECW.* References are to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Collected Works*, 50 volumes. London: Lawrence and Wishart; Moscow: Progress Publishers; New York: International Publishers, 1975–2005.

*MEGA*. References are to (section and volu me of) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*. 70 volumes completed to date. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1975–98; Akademie Verlag, 1998–. The *MEGA* is divided into Section I: Works, Articles and Drafts; Section II: *Capital* and Preliminary Works; Section III: Letters to and from Marx and Engels; and Section IV: Excerpts, Notes and Marginalia.

*MEGA digital.* References are to the relevant entry in the megadigital.bbaw.de database. The outstanding volumes from Section III (letters from January 1866 onward) and Section IV are (sadly) published solely in this online database rather than as printed volumes.

*MEGA*②. References are to (section and volume of) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Historische-kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke, Schriften, Briefe*. 12 volumes (of projected 42) completed. Frankfurt am Main: Marx-Engels Archiv, 1927; Berlin: Marx-Engels-Verlag, 1929–32; Moscow: Marx-Engels-Verlag, 1935.

*MEW.* References are to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, 39 volumes plus "Ergänzungsbände." Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1957–.

*Philosophie des Rechts*. References are to G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970; and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edited and introduced by Allen W. Wood, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. References are to sections (§); an "A" indicates Hegel's "Remarks (*Anmerkungen*)" and a "Z" indicates editorial "Additions (*Zusätzen*)."

*Redaktionsbriefwechsel.* References are to *Der Redaktionsbriefwechsel der Hallischen, Deutschen und Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbücher (1837–1844)*. Edited by Martin Hundt. 2 volumes. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010.

*Werke und Briefe*. References are to Arnold Ruge, *Werke und Briefe*. Edited by Hans-Martin Sass. 12 of 13 volumes published. Amsterdam and Aaalen: Scientia Verlag, 1988–.

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Bruno Leipold, "Marx's Social Republic: Radical Republicanism and the Political Institutions of Socialism," in *Radical Republicanism: Recovering the Tradition's Popular Heritage*, eds. Bruno Leipold, Karma Nabulsi, and Stuart White (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 172–193.

Bruno Leipold, "Chains and Invisible Threads: Liberty and Domination in Marx's Account of Wage-Slavery," in *Rethinking Liberty before Liberalism*, ed. Hannah Dawson and Annelien de Dijn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 194–214.

# PREFACE

I HAVE BEEN THINKING and writing about Marx and republicanism for a long time—much longer than I ever anticipated I would. Again and again, I thought I was finished, only to find another letter, a further Marx critique, yet more republican contemporaries, that had to be included. Republicanism, as I learned and hope to convince the reader, touched upon and influenced so many aspects of Marx that it was difficult to know when or where to end. As deadlines sailed by, I was kept going by the conviction that trying to come to grips with Marx and republicanism said something important about his thought and political life: that republican freedom suffused Marx's critique of the social domination of capitalism and that he believed that this domination could only be overcome through democratic republican political institutions. Rarely is it adequately appreciated that by making the latter integral to the goal of collective ownership, Marx distinguished his republican communism from the antipolitical socialism and anticommunist republicanism of his day. By placing Marx's thought in the context of these competitors, I hope this book provides a clearer sense of his commitment to politics, democracy, and freedom. Those commitments are unsurprisingly denied in the many caricatures of Marx's ideas but are also frequently obscured by commentators on Marx who should know better. Though this is a historical study, I have been drawn to Marx and republicanism because I believe that his republican commitments are still central to the political and social struggles of our day.

It is hard to know when a book is ready and, contrary to Mark Twain, had I taken more time I would probably have simply written a longer one. But I believe it is comprehensive enough that I am now happy, and more than a little relieved, to lay it before the reader. Bringing it to completion gives me an opportunity to thank the very many people who helped me along the way. I want to begin by expressing my deep gratitude to David Leopold. When as a student I first opened his book on the young Marx, I had only intended to check a few pages, but I soon realized that it would be impossible not to read it all. It opened my eyes to the possibility that through careful analytic and contextual study, Marx's sometimes opaque writings could be clarified and understood as political interventions in the debates of his times. One of the foremost

academic privileges that I have enjoyed was being subsequently supervised by David for the doctoral thesis that eventually became this book. Since then, whenever I have been too quick to assume influence or have overstated some claim, I am fondly reminded of him peering over his glasses and suggesting that it might be a bit more complicated than that. While I have an increasingly forlorn hope that our colleagues and students might one day be able tell our names apart, their confusion always leaves me feeling a little flattered.

This project has had to pass through many academic hoops and I'm grateful to those who've helped the book make it to publication. Two reviewers, who subsequently identified themselves as William Clare Roberts and Terrell Carver, provided incredibly generous comments on the manuscript. Their insightful reading helped sharpen the book's contribution, and I felt very privileged to be supported by scholars whose political and contextual approach to Marx I so admire. Lea Ypi and Jonathan Wolff provided similar support at an earlier stage in the project, and their advice was instrumental in the transition from thesis to book. John Filling supervised the very earliest incarnation of this project; his powerful lectures first spurred my interest in Marx, and he deserves the credit (or blame!) for starting me on the path that led to this book. Matt Rohal has been a model editor, deftly shepherding the book from proposal to proofs, while providing unfailingly helpful advice from the smallest publication questions to the bigger picture of the book's central arguments. I am furthermore very grateful to the excellent team at Princeton University Press, Natalie Baan, Elizabeth Blazejewski, Alena Chekanov, Anne Cherry, Susan Clark, Jess Massabrook, Terri O'Prey, William Pagdatoon, Karl Spurzem, Steve Stillman, and Erin Suydam, for their hard work in bringing the book to publication.

Academic work would be a very lonely world without the friendship and advice of the colleagues and comrades who populate it. Pascale Siegrist is owed special thanks for patiently (or mostly patiently) allowing me to repeatedly interrupt her work in our various shared offices over the years and answering what must amount to several thousand historical questions. With her encyclopaedic knowledge and linguistic gifts, she has generously helped a self-taught historian become a little less amateurish. Mirjam Müller has been an endless source of support and guidance ever since we started on our academic careers. Her socialist-feminist criticisms reminded me when to discuss Marx's own emancipatory limitations. Jan Kandiyali read most of the book and provided annoyingly insightful comments, forcing several rewrites; I am very grateful to him for this and for our conversations at LSE and beyond. Stuart White and Karma Nabulsi, my fellow radical republicans, showed me that republicanism was not just a theory but a political movement of republicans who lived and died for their ideals. Anne Phillips was an outstanding mentor at LSE and went above and beyond to offer counsel and support. Samuel

Hayat helped organize a short but productive stay at Sciences Po, Paris. James Muldoon has never stopped encouraging me to think and write (faster!) about republican socialism. Udit Bhatia has been a continual guide on democracy and democratic theory. Max Krahé offered much-appreciated insight on questions of capitalism and political economy. Without Avram (Avi) Alpert's sage advice to write a good enough, not perfect, book, I might never have been able to send off the manuscript.

Several institutions have assisted me with research materials, including the Bibliothèque nationale de France, the Boston Public Library, the British Library, the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, the Universitätsbibliothek Basel, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, and the Beinecke Library at Yale University; I am especially grateful to Julie Herrada for her help with a visit to the Karl Heinzen Papers at the University of Michigan Library. A fellowship at The New Institute provided an ideal institutional home to complete the book, and I am very thankful to its wonderful fellows and staff: Christiane Müller and Britta Neumann helped track down several obscure sources; Tom Bodensteiner, Ina Krug, and Jannic Welte created an incomparably congenial environment. I have been awed by the generosity of scholars willing to answer questions about their specialties, and I am indebted in this regard to Frederick C. Beiser, Elias Buchetmann, Patrick Carey, Jürgen Herres, Stephen Houlgate, Philip Schofield, and Diana Siclovan. I would also like to express a special thanks to the LSE students who attended my course on *The Idea of Freedom* and whose probing questions helped me to think more carefully about the nature of freedom.

The friendship, at times virtual and socially distanced, of Yas Alttahir, Johannes Gerling, Leona Leipold, Marion Lieutaud, James Muldoon, and Mirjam Müller carried me through lockdowns and the more joyful times since. My sister Lele, Zelda co-adventurer, has been an irreplaceable source of love and support and has done her best to keep me alive both in and outside of Hyrule. Similarly, friends in and beyond political theory have ensured that my various academic stops from Frankfurt to Florence, London to Hamburg, have felt like home; my heartfelt thanks to Signy Gutnick Allen, Paul Apostolidis, David Axelsen, Anthea Behm, Gabrielle Bieser, Christine Braun, Julia Costet, Puneet Dhaliwal, Richard James Elliott, Akwugo Emejulu, Roop Gill, Alice Gustson, Ariane Haase, Frederic Hanusch, Vincent Harting, Ronan Kaczynski, Hwa Young Kim, Jens van 't Kloster, Johannes Kniess, Shiru Lim, Xufan (Nadia) Ma, Sabrina Martin, Tobias Müller, Marius Ostrowski, Liban Parker, Tom Parr, Tomás Quesada-Alpízar, Minna Salami, Kai Spiekermann, Tania Shew, Andreas Sorger, Lukas Slothuus, Rahel Süß, Stephanie Wanga, Felix Westerén, and Tim Wihl. My siblings, Tara, Maya, Nikhil, Brendan and Sean Jackson; and my parents, Steve Jackson, Rosalind Reeve and Gerd Leipold, have provided the unconditional love that has

sustained me when I needed it most. Additional thanks to my father for his help deciphering some of the more difficult nineteenth-century German handwriting. Marion Lieutaud first won my heart with her Marx comics and kept it with her fierce loyalty, intellect, and courage. She has had a first-row seat for all the tribulations of writing and her belief that I could, would, and should finish gave me the strength to do so. Her conviction that academic work should have an emancipatory purpose beyond the comforting confines of the university continues to inspire me.

In the first draft of these acknowledgments, I had dedicated the book solely to my German and Irish and English grandparents, Emma and Leo Leipold and Rosemary and Gordon Bull. They played an outsized role in our upbringing and created for us two homes away from home. Their untiring willingness to listen to my precocious enthusiasms might have prepared me badly for academic peer review, but without it I might never have developed the confidence to do any of this. I miss them hugely.

While reviewing the final edits to the manuscript my aunt Brigitte Leipold passed away. She showed me that socialism was not only an ideal to work and fight for, but a way to live one's life and treat one another. She brought joy to every room she entered, effortlessly reciting everything from Brecht to Bombadil and the Bandiera Rossa. She experienced firsthand a system that had betrayed most of its socialist ideals yet managed to never lose hope *dass der Mensch eines Tages fliegen wird*.

# CITIZEN MARX

# Introduction

> Cit[izen] Engels said . . . Before our ideas could be carried into practice, we must have the Republic . . . the republic gave a fair field for the working classes to agitate.
>
> Cit[izen] Marx was convinced that no Republican movement could become serious without becoming social. The wire pullers of the present move[ment] of course intended no such thing.
>
> —*Minutes of the General Council of the International Working-Men's Association (IWMA)*[1]

In November 1850 the Chartist newspaper *The Red Republican* published the first English translation of the *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei* under the modified title "German Communism: Manifesto of the German Communist Party." Using the standard form of address among nineteenth-century radicals, the editor named "Citizens *Charles Marx* and *Frederic Engels*" for the first time as the authors of the revolutionary document that had appeared on the eve of the revolutions that swept across Europe two years earlier.[2] The translation was carried out by Helen Macfarlane, a Scottish feminist and socialist republican, who had authored several of her own articles in *The Red Republican* under the male pseudonym Howard Morton and was acquainted with Marx and Engels through the radical exile community in London. Her translation was subsequently supplanted in English-language discussions by the

1. "Meeting of the General Council March 28, 1871," *MEGA* I.22: 526 / *MECW* 22: 587.

2. "German Communism: Manifesto of the German Communist Party," *The Red Republican*, no. 21 (9 November 1850): 161. "Citizen" originated in the French Revolution as an egalitarian replacement for aristocratic titles. It was only toward the end of the century that it was superseded by "Comrade"; see Jonathan Sperber, *Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 535.

now-standard 1888 edition carried out by Samuel Moore and supervised by Engels. Yet Macfarlane's translation retains much of value for modern readers, not least because of her attempt to render a new social and political vocabulary into English. "Proletarians" was used interchangeably with "wage-slaves," the "lumpenproletariat" became the "Mob," and the "petty bourgeoisie" was referred to by the appealing coinage "shopocrats." The achievements of the Macfarlane translation have, however, been unfortunately overshadowed by its peculiar rendition of the manifesto's striking opening line, "Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa—das Gespenst des Kommunismus." While the 1888 translation rendered it "A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism," Macfarlane's version read, "A frightful hobgoblin stalks throughout Europe. We are haunted by a ghost, the ghost of Communism."

Marx and Engels's choice of *The Red Republican* for the translation of their manifesto was a natural one, not only because of their deep respect for the Chartist movement but because the paper embodied an emerging fusion of socialist criticism with the political demands of republicanism. As Helen Macfarlane and editor George Julian Harney made clear in the paper's opening pages, social and political reform were inextricable. Macfarlane defended what she called "the new—and yet old—religion of Socialist-democracy," which insisted "that political reform must *precede* all attempts to improve the condition of the people," and she chided the antipolitical socialist movements of British Owenists and French Saint-Simonians whose abstention from politics meant that "they have never yet been able to put their Social Theories *into practice*."[3] Harney, for his part, argued that democratic political institutions would always be under threat from the "aggressions of the propertied classes . . . who will conspire to subvert popular Suffrage, the moment an attempt may be made to make the ballot-box an instrument for the protection of the poor." Thus "representative institutions, universal sufferage [*sic*], freedom of the press, trial by jury . . . are all utterly valueless, unless associated with such social changes" that would enable the "actual sovereignty of society." Harney consequently concluded that "Political freedom is incompatible with social slavery."[4]

3. Howard Morton [Helen Macfarlane], "Chartism in 1850," *The Red Republican*, no. 1 (22 June 1850): 2–3. On Macfarlane, see David Black, *Helen Macfarlane: A Feminist, Revolutionary Journalist, and Philosopher in Mid-Nineteenth Century England* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004); David Leopold, "Macfarlane, Helen," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online ed. (Oxford University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/odnb/9780198614128.013.100743.

4. L'Ami du Peuple [George Julian Harney], "The Charter and Something More!," *The Red Republican*, no. 1 (22 June 1850): 1–2. On Harney, see Albert Schoyen, *The Chartist Challenge: A Portrait of George Julian Harney* (London: Heinemann, 1958).

The title of the *Red Republican* encapsulated this bold new fused social and political program. Harney mused that adding "this new-fangled 'Red'" to the already dangerous "Republican," would mean that a jury, "on being informed of the title of your publication, would at once convict you" and "[e]ven the Liberals would say 'hanging is too good for such a fellow.'"[5] The title did indeed prove too bold. Booksellers refused to stock the paper, and Harney was worried enough about official prosecution that he eventually changed the name to the less directly confrontational *Friend of the People* (inspired by Jean-Paul Marat's French revolutionary paper, *L'ami du peuple*). When the final issue of *The Red Republican* appeared on 30 November 1850, its closing article happened to be the final section of the "Manifesto of the German Communist Party," so that the paper's last words read, "Let the Proletarians of all countries unite!" (a slightly less captivating, but more accurate, version than the better-known translation: "WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!").[6] But this was not the only appeal to the working class made in the final issue of the *Red Republican*. Serialized alongside the "Manifesto" was a set of articles, entitled "Republican Principles," which just a few pages before Marx and Engels's more famous appeal had concluded with the call "WORKING-MEN! I appeal to you . . . [to] join me to begin the foundation of our English Republic!"[7]

The author of "Republican Principles" was William James Linton, a Chartist and artisan engraver, who had become known in London's radical circles through his friendship and political association with Giuseppe Mazzini, at the time Europe's most prominent republican. It was Linton who designed and engraved the dramatic masthead of *The Red Republican*, which depicted the republican symbols of the liberty cap, the spear, and the fasces, sitting on top of the revolutionary motto "EQUALITY, LIBERTY, FRATERNITY" (see figure 1). Linton's intellectual contribution to *The Red Republican* was intended as an extended explication of the principles articulated in the manifesto of the European Central Democratic Committee, an organization set up by Mazzini to coordinate the activities of the European republicans exiled in London after the failed revolutions.[8] In the introduction to "Republican Principles," Linton

5. [George Julian Harney], "Our Name and Principles," *The Red Republican*, no. 1 (22 June 1850): 4.

6. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the German Communist Party," *The Red Republican*, no. 24 (30 November 1850): 190. The original German reads, "*Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!*"

7. W. J. Linton, "Republican Principles," *The Red Republican*, no. 24 (30 November 1850): 187.

8. "Aux Peuples! Organisation de le démocratie," *Le Proscrit: Journal de la république universelle*, no. 2 (August 1850): 3-13 / "To the Peoples, Organization of Democracy," *The Red*




EQUALITY, LIBERTY, FRATERNITY.

EDITED BY G. JULIAN HARNEY.

No. 21.—Vol. I. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1850. [Price One Penny.

# German Communism.

## MANIFESTO OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

(Published in February, 1848.)

The following Manifesto, which has since been adopted by all fractions of German Communists, was drawn up in the German language, in January 1848, by Citizens *Charles Marx* and *Frederic Engels*. It was immediately printed in London, in the German language, and published a few days before the outbreak of the Revolution of February. The turmoil consequent upon that great event made it impossible to carry out, at that time, the intention of translating it into all the languages of civilized Europe. There exist two different French versions of it in manuscript, but under the present oppressive laws of France, the publication of either of them has been found impracticable. The English reader will be enabled, by the following excellent translation of this important document, to judge of the plans and principles of the most advanced party of the German Revolutionists.

It must not be forgotten, that the whole of this Manifesto was written and printed before the Revolution of February.

A frightful hobgoblin stalks throughout Europe. We are haunted by a ghost, the ghost of Communism. All the Powers of the Past have joined in a holy crusade to lay this ghost to rest,—the Pope and the Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police agents. Where is the opposition which has not been accused of Communism by its enemies in Power? And where the opposition that has not hurled this blighting accusation at the heads of the more advanced oppositionists, as well as at those of its official enemies? Two things appear on considering these facts. I. The ruling Powers of Europe acknowledge Communism to be also a Power. II. It is time for the Communists to lay before the world an account of their aims and tendencies, and to oppose these silly fables about the bugbear of Communism, by a manifesto of the Communist Party.

### CHAPTER I.

### BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS.

Hitherto the history of Society has been the history of the battles between the classes composing it. Freemen and Slaves, Patricians and Plebeians, Nobles and Serfs, Members of Guilds and journeymen,—in a word, the oppressors and the oppressed, have always stood in direct opposition to each other. The battle between them has sometimes been open, sometimes concealed, but always continuous. A never-ceasing battle, which has invariably ended, either in a revolutionary alteration of the social system, or in the common destruction of the hostile classes.

In the earlier historical epochs we find almost everywhere a minute division of Society into classes or ranks, a variety of grades in social position. In ancient Rome we find Patricians, Knights, Plebeians, Slaves; in mediæval Europe, Feudal Lords, Vassals, Burghers, Journeymen, Serfs; and in each of these classes there were again grades and distinctions. Modern Bourgeois Society, proceeded from the ruins of the feudal system, but the Bourgeois régime has not abolished the antagonism of classes.

New classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms and modes of carrying on the struggle, have been substituted for the old ones. The characteristic of our Epoch, the Era of the Middle-class, or Bourgeoisie, is that the struggle between the various Social Classes, has been reduced to its simplest form. Society incessantly tends to be divided into two great camps, into two great hostile armies, the Bourgeoisie and the Prolétariat.

The burgesses of the early Communes sprang from the Serfs of the Middle Ages, and from this Municipal class were developed the primitive elements of the modern Bourgeoisie. The discovery of the New World, the circumnavigation of Africa, gave the Middleclass—then coming into being—new fields of action. The colonization of America, the opening up of the East Indian and Chinese Markets, the Colonial Trade, the increase of commodities generally and of the means of exchange, gave an impetus, hitherto unknown, to Commerce, Shipping, and Manufactures; and aided the rapid evolution of the revolutionary element in the old decaying, feudal form of Society. The old feudal way of managing the industrial interest by means of guilds and monopolies was not found sufficient for the increased demand caused by the opening up of these new markets. It was replaced by the manufacturing system. Guilds vanished before the industrial Middle-class, and the division of labour between the different corporations was succeeded by the division of labour between the workmen of one and the same great workshop.

But the demand always increased, new markets came into play. The manufacturing system, in its turn, was found to be inadequate. At this point industrial Production was revolutionised by machinery and steam. The modern industrial system was developed in all its gigantic proportions; instead of the industrial Middle-class we find industrial millionaires, chiefs of whole industrial armies, the modern Bourgeois, or Middle-class Capitalists. The discovery of America was the first step towards the formation of a colossal market, embracing the whole world; whereby an immense developement was given to Commerce, and to the means of communication by sea and land. This again reacted upon the industrial system, and the developement of the Bourgeoisie, the increase of their Capital, the superseding of all classes handed down to modern times from the Middle Ages, kept pace with the dovelopement of Production, Trade, and Steam communication.

We find, therefore, that the modern Bourgeoisie are themselves the result of a long process of developement, of a series of revolutions in the modes of Production and Exchange. Each of the degrees of industrial evolution, passed through by the modern Middle-class, was accompanied by a corresponding

FIGURE 1. German Communism: "Manifesto of the German Communist Party," *The Red Republican* (9 November 1850). Courtesy of Senate House Library, University of London.

addressed himself to "the countrymen of Milton and Cromwell" and declared that through his articles he hoped to "establish the basis of a really republican party, by rendering republican principles plain and easy of comprehension." Marx and Engels had similarly opened their "Manifesto" with the declaration that "It is time for the Communists to lay before the world an account of their aims and tendencies, and to oppose these silly fables about the bugbear of Communism, by a manifesto of the Communist Party."[9]

Linton's "Republican Principles" and Marx and Engels's "Manifesto of the German Communist Party" thus provided a literally side-by-side attempt to set out the principles of republicanism and communism. Reading their two manifestos together showcases several key differences between the two traditions. Linton opened with an explication of the meaning of the trinity of "Equality—Liberty—Humanity" (a term he thought was more inclusive than "Fraternity") that formed the "battle-cry of the Republican"; Marx and Engels's began with a portrayal of the rise of the bourgeoisie and their unrelenting "need of an ever-increasing market for their produce, [which] drives the Bourgeoisie over the whole globe."[10] Where "Republican Principles" condemned any political system in which "a caste rules . . . [with] tyrants on one side, and slaves upon the other," the "Manifesto of the German Communist Party" railed against the "modern slavery of Labour under Capital" in which proletarians were subject to a "despotism" where they were "not only the slaves of the whole middle-class (as a body) . . . they are daily and hourly slaves . . . of each individual manufacturing Bourgeois."[11] While Linton argued that emancipation would only be achieved through "the regular association of all classes, the organized association of the people," Marx and Engels identified the new class of proletarians as "the only truly revolutionary Class amongst the present enemies of the Bourgeoisie."[12] Finally, where "Republican Principles" defended a system of "free Nations" united in a "universal FEDERATION OF REPUBLICS," the "Manifesto of the German Communist Party" declared that "[t]he Proletarian has no Fatherland" and predicted the "obliteration" of "National divisions and antagonisms."[13]

Yet these seemingly stark differences can distract us from some of the manifestos' commonalities. As much as Marx and Engels were focused on the social

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*Republican*, no. 12 (7 September 1850): 94–95. For the ECDC, see Christine Lattek, *Revolutionary Refugees: German Socialism in Britain, 1840–1860* (London: Routledge, 2006), 88–94.

9. Linton, "Republican Principles," 110; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 161.

10. Linton, "Republican Principles," 110–11; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 162.

11. Linton, "Republican Principles," 172; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 171.

12. Linton, "Republican Principles," 125; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 171.

13. Linton, "Republican Principles," 187; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 182.

dependency of workers, they also believed that workers were "the slaves . . . of the Bourgeois political regime" and defended a strategy where "the first step in the proletarian revolution, will be the conquest of Democracy," criticizing forms of socialism that "oppose all political movements in the Proletariat." Linton, for his part, did not restrict himself to political criticism, but also condemned the domination of the "wages slave" and the "factory slave," and insisted that it was the "business of Government" to end their dependency.[14] Their respective social programs were also not as far apart as we might assume. Linton defended three core social policies in "Republican Principles": free access to the land through nationalization, free state education, and the provision of free credit. The "Manifesto of the German Communist Party" included a ten-point list of demands that similarly called for the "[t]he national appropriation of the land," "[c]entralisation of credit in the hands of the State," and "[t]he public and gratuitous education of all children."[15]

Where these social programs did come apart was the defining issue of private property. Linton opposed the communist demand for the abolition of private property, as "we do not believe that 'the institution' of private property is inevitably a nuisance. Our complaint is . . . not that the few have, but the many have not." Marx and Engels, on the other hand, insisted that it was not simply a question of abolishing private property as such but specifically the "*abolition of Bourgeois property*," private property based on the exploitation of wage-labor, and in this specified sense they were unapologetic that "the Communists might resume their whole Theory in that single expression—*The abolition of private property*."[16] Linton and his fellow republicans believed that people had a right to the private property they had worked to create, but also that it was the state's duty to be "the Nation's Banker, to furnish each individual with the material means—the capital—for work." Providing free credit and free land would mean that workers could acquire the means to work independently and break free from the "mischievous middle-men called capitalists." For Marx and Engels, such schemes were a desperate attempt to save "the property of the small shopkeeper, small tradesman, [and] small peasant" which the "progress of industrial development is daily destroying." They insisted that trying to restore an economy of independent artisans and peasants was hopeless in the face of the productive and competitive advantages of large-scale capitalist industry. Such attempts were "even reactionary, for they attempt to turn backwards the chariot wheels of History." Rather than try to restore individual

14. Linton, "Republican Principles," 156; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 171, 183, 190.

15. Linton, "Republican Principles," 156, 164; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 183.

16. Linton, "Republican Principles," 147; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 181.

property, communism would build on the achievements of capitalism and its "mass of productive power" by collectivizing the "instruments of production in the hands of the State."[17] They believed that only collective ownership of the means of production (which Marx would later think could be carried out through worker cooperatives rather than simply state ownership)[18] could adequately address the social dependency of the proletariat and destroy the power of capital. Republicanism and Marx and Engels's communism were thus divided as to whether the private property of small-scale independent producers should be universalized, or capitalist private property abolished and replaced by common ownership.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, these competing social and political visions repeatedly came into conflict, but also opened opportunities for mutual engagement, political alliances, and intellectual fusion. The publication of the "Manifesto of the German Communist Party" and "Republican Principles" in *The Red Republican* was just one example of the broader struggle of republicans and communists to define the goals of the radical movement and secure the support of the working class. As we will see, it was also just one of many instances of how republicanism was central to the formation of Marx's social and political thought.

## Marx and Republicanism

In 1913, Lenin provided one of the most enduring portraits of Marx's intellectual formation, depicting him as having inherited and synthetized three national traditions: "German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism."[19] This triadic account is memorable but problematic. As David

17. Linton, "Republican Principles," 156; Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 171, 182–83. Of course, Marx and Engels were not directly responding to Linton's articles (which postdate their original publication). But, as is shown in chapters 4 and 5, these arguments were directed at republican interlocutors like Karl Heinzen.

18. Marx, "Address of the International Working Men's Association (Inaugural Address)," *MEGA* I.20: 10 / *MECW* 20: 11; *Das Kapital*, vol. 1, *MEGA* II.6: 328n / *MECW* 35: 336n; *Das Kapital*, vol. 3, *MEGA* II.15: 431 / *MECW* 37: 438.

19. Vladimir Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism," in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 19 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963), 23–24. For a defense, see G. A. Cohen, "The Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism," in *Marxism, Mysticism and Modern Theory*, ed. Suke Wolton (London: Macmillan, 1996), 1–6. Such triadic accounts have their origin in Moses Hess's *Die europäische Triarchie* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1841). For Marx and Engels's use of this triadic image (though with French socialism interestingly replaced by French "politics," which better captures socialism's republican heritage), see Engels, "Progress of Social

Leopold argues, apart from demoting the influence of Belgium, where Marx spent an oft-forgotten exile from 1845–48, it simplifies the contribution of any of these countries to a single discipline, suggesting, for instance, that the English (more accurately British, and particularly Scottish) influence on Marx only extended to political economy rather than, say, Britain's own tradition of socialism.[20] From the perspective of this book, the triadic account also falls short because if we want to understand the influences on Marx's thought we have to understand the formative role played by European republicanism.[21]

The complex influence of republicanism on Marx's thought, however, resists easy reduction to wholesale adoption or rejection (encapsulated by the contrasting points raised by Citizen Engels and Citizen Marx about republicanism in the meeting of the IWMA cited in this chapter's epigraph). Influence should be understood as not only the causal tracing of an affinity, when Marx's ideas can be shown to have been inherited from republicanism, but also negative influence, when Marx formed his ideas in opposition to republicanism.[22] Marx both incorporated republican commitments into his communism to critique antipolitical socialisms and positioned this republican communism to supplant anticommunist republicanism. Republicanism thus formed a body of ideas and political movement out of which and against which Marx shaped and defined his own communism.

Complicating the picture further is that Marx's relationship to republicanism changed over the course of his life. The overarching argument of this book, and what gives it its organizing structure, is that his relationship proceeds in three principal periods.[23] To give an initial snapshot: first, Marx began his political career in 1842 as a republican committed to overcoming the arbitrary power of despotic regimes through a democratic republic in which the people held active popular sovereignty through public administration by citizens and

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Reform on the Continent," *MEGA* I.3: 495 / *MECW* 3: 392–93; Marx, "Kritische Randglossen zu dem Artikel: "Der König von Preußen und die Socialreform: Von einem Preußen," *MEGA* I.2: 459 / *MECW* 3: 202; Marx, *Entwurf über Friedrich List*, *MEGA* I.4: 579 / *MECW* 4: 281.

20. David Leopold, "Karl Marx and 'English Socialism,'" *Nineteenth-Century Prose* 49, no. 1 (2022): 6–7, 20–21.

21. That is not to say that republicanism is only a European phenomenon (as is often suggested in orientalist and Western-centric accounts of the tradition), only that it is the form of republicanism that most influenced Marx.

22. For this general distinction (and for the idea of affinity without causally traceable influence), see Leopold, "Karl Marx and 'English Socialism,'" 11–12.

23. These correspond to the three parts of the book, whose titles are loosely based on Marx's classification of republics into "democratic," "bourgeois," and "social" in *Der achtzehnte Brumaire*, *MEGA* I.11: 103–4, 174–75 / *MECW* 11: 109–10, 181–82.

the control of representatives through binding mandates, a position from which, over the course of 1843–44, he progressively transitioned to communism (chapters 1–3). Second, from this new communist standpoint, in the years leading up to the 1848 Revolutions and its aftermath, Marx both criticized republicanism and also incorporated the republican opposition to arbitrary power into his social critique of capitalism and the commitment to a democratic republic into his politics, though his more radical ideas of a polity with far-reaching political participation receded into the background (chapters 4–6). Third, spurred by the Paris Commune of 1871, those ideas eventually reemerged later in Marx's life, when he came to see extensive popular control and participation in legislation and public administration as essential to the realization of communism (chapter 7). Marx thus came to a fuller synthesis of his early republicanism and his later communism.

Chapter 1 opens with an account of Marx's early republican journalism. In Marx's first definitive statement of his politics, in early 1842, he criticized not just Prussia's absolute monarchy but the liberal goal of a reformed constitutional monarchy, while expressing his frustration at the difficulty of realizing a modern "Res publica" in Germany.[24] Strict official censorship meant that in his public journalism Marx avoided frontal attacks on the Prussian regime and instead concentrated on particular instances of its arbitrary power. He criticized Prussia's feudal estate assemblies for their exclusion of the people and consequent failure to represent the common good and attacked press censorship for making journalists and editors dependent on the character of individual censors. Underlying these criticisms lay a commitment to a republican conception of freedom as the absence of arbitrary power, where freedom is secured by laws made collectively by the citizenry. Marx argued that there was a fundamental opposition between "arbitrariness and freedom," so that a citizen was only free when ruled by law, warning that "I do not at all believe that persons can be a guarantee against laws; on the contrary, I believe that laws must be a guarantee against persons."[25] But Marx also insisted that freedom required not only the rule of law, but for that law to be collectively made by the people, so that "law is the conscious expression of the popular will, in that it originates with it and is created by it."[26] Censorship made it difficult to elaborate that democratic, and dangerous, idea in anything more than isolated glimpses, with Marx only hinting at the necessity of "transforming the

24. Marx to Arnold Ruge, 5 March 1842, *MEGA* III.1: 22 / *MECW* 1: 382–83.

25. Marx, "Debatten über Preßfreiheit," *MEGA* I.1: 153 / *MECW* 1: 165; "Debatten über das Holzdiebstahlgesetz," *MEGA* I.1: 217 / *MECW* 1: 243.

26. Marx, "Der Ehescheidungsgesetzenentwurf," *MEGA* I.1: 289 / *MECW* 1: 309.

mysterious, priestly nature of the state into a clear-cut entity of the ordinary people, accessible to all and belonging to all, making the state the flesh and blood of its citizens."[27]

When Prussia banned his newspaper, Marx was freed to turn to a foundational critique of Hegel's defense of constitutional monarchy, as is recounted in chapter 2. In his critique, Marx defended popular sovereignty against Hegel's embrace of monarchical sovereignty, attacked the central role Hegel had attributed to the elite bureaucracy at the expense of popular participation in politics and administration, and criticized Hegel's views on representation and instead defended popular delegacy. Marx condemned Hegel's supposedly constitutional monarch for being "the *hallowed, sanctified embodiment* of arbitrariness" and whose monopolization of sovereignty meant that "all others are excluded from this sovereignty, from personality and from political consciousness."[28] Hegel's bureaucracy, that was supposed to be a neutral arbiter of the general interest, in fact "protect[ed] the *imaginary* generality of [its] . . . particular interest," was insulated from effective "guarantee[s] against the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy," and excluded the people from public administration which should in fact "belong . . . to the whole people."[29] Against Hegel's defense of a legislature elected on a narrow franchise and without binding mandates, Marx argued for "the *extension* and greatest possible *generalization* of *election*, both of *active* and *passive* suffrage" and insisted that without binding instructions the "deputies of civil society form a society which is not linked with those who commission them."[30] In place of Hegel's constitutional monarchy, Marx defended a "true democracy" in which "the constitution is . . . the self-determination of the people . . . the people's *own* work . . . [and] the free product of man."[31] Alongside this democratic vision, Marx expressed his republican skepticism of the emerging theories of socialism and communism. He attacked "actually existing communism" for its single-minded pursuit of the "[a]bolition of private property" and failure to see the necessity of "partisan participation in politics." "The critic," Marx insisted, "not only can but must engage in these political questions (which according to the views of the crass socialists are beneath their dignity)."[32]

27. Marx, "Replik auf den Angriff eines 'gemäßigten' Blattes," *MEGA* I.1: 333 / *MECW* 1: 318.

28. Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, MEGA* I.2: 27, 38 / *MECW* 3: 26, 36.

29. Ibid., 50, 56, 58 / 46, 53–54.

30. Ibid., 130, 133 / 120, 123.

31. Ibid., 31–32 / 29–30.

32. Marx to Arnold Ruge, September 1843, "Ein Briefwechsel von 1843," *MEGA* I.2: 487–88 / *MECW* 3: 143–44.

Nevertheless, within a few short months of writing these lines Marx had overcome his opposition to the abolition of private property and made his own transition to communism, which forms the subject of chapter 3. While that transition involved a political distancing from republicanism it was not a transition to "actually existing communism," but the fashioning of a new form of communism that integrated much of his prior republicanism. His shift from republicanism was driven by a growing disillusionment with the ability of political emancipation, through a democratic republic, to establish truly human emancipation, and by a realization that the proletariat, through its dispossession from property, was uniquely positioned to do so. The former was driven by an assessment that the American and French Revolutions had created republics in which the (laudable) establishment of freedom in the political sphere had been paired with a transference of unfreedom into the social sphere. Marx consequently concluded "that the state can be a *free state* without man being a *free man*."[33] That critiqued and amended an old republican argument that it is "only possible to be free in a free state."[34] Freedom, Marx insisted, required not just a free state but a *free society*. But as much as Marx may have sometimes wished to condemn republicanism as such with this argument, it was only an indictment of a kind of bourgeois (or liberal) republicanism that had little popular appeal. The republicanism that galvanized broad working-class support across the nineteenth century recognized the social dimensions of freedom long before Marx. Of almost greater consequence for Marx's transition away from republicanism was in fact his identification with the proletarian working class as the agent of future social and political revolution, rather than with the independent artisan worker idealized by republicans.

As is argued in chapter 4, Marx's criticism of the emancipatory limits of the republic eventually hardened into an assessment that the modern republic, as was briefly established in France after the 1848 Revolution, was in fact a "*bourgeois republic* . . . the state whose admitted object it is to perpetuate the rule of capital, the slavery of labor."[35] Marx condemned the bourgeois republic as a regime in which the bourgeoisie held political power, the economy was structured in its class interests, and even its constitution was designed to uphold this political and economic rule. But this criticism did not lead Marx to dismiss the republic as an unworthy political goal. He insisted that the bourgeois republic was "the terrain for the fight for its [the proletariat's] revolutionary

33. Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," *MEGA* I.2: 147 / *MECW* 3: 152.

34. Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 60.

35. Marx, *Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich*, *MEGA* I.10: 139 / *MECW* 10: 69.

emancipation," even though it was "by no means this emancipation itself."[36] That position is easily taken for granted but represented a break with the sharply antithetical attitudes to politics and democratic republican institutions that dominated early socialism (chapter 4 consequently devotes extensive space to these antipolitical socialists and Marx and Engels's response to them). While Charles Fourier and Robert Owen hoped to bypass politics through the peaceful spread of communitarian experiments supported by the benevolence of the rich and powerful, Henri Saint-Simon dreamed up technocratic schemes in which popular rule was supplanted by an administration of industrialists and scientific and technical experts. Those attitudes continued to inform the next generation of socialists and communists, who advocated for workers to abstain from politics and focus on raising consciousness through peaceful propaganda and education. In a common complaint, these socialists asked, "Will the republic pay our debts? Will it redeem our pawned goods? Will it clothe and feed us?," and as supposedly "no political institutions are capable of abolishing" these social problems, they urged workers to "not at any time take part in *political revolutions*."[37] They confidently insisted that " 'today's republicans' and their 'notions of "electoral reform", "democracy", "revolution", "Cahiers" are outdated and discounted.'"[38]

When Marx (and especially Engels) initially and independently converted to communism, they briefly shared some sympathy for these antipolitical ideas.[39] But, in part through their growing collaboration, they soon embraced the label of "Democratic Communists," in which the "democratic reconstruction of the Constitution" was taken to be an essential element whereby the working class would be able to come to political power and be in a position to bring about communism.[40] That in essence would remain their central political commitment throughout their lives. Marx and Engels were convinced that civic freedoms and universal (manhood) suffrage were essential tools to expand working-class power and challenge capitalist rule. Marx was confident that "universal suffrage" put the working class and its allies in "possession of the political power" and

36. Ibid., 125 / 54.

37. Herman Semmig, *Sächsische Zustände: Nebst Randglossen und Leuchtkugeln* (Hamburg: C. F. Vogel, 1846), 9, 63.

38. Karl Grün, "Politik und Sozialismus," *Rheinische Jahrbücher für gesellschaftlichen Reform*, vol. 1, ed. Hermann Püttmann (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske, 1845), 136. *Cahiers* were the documents of complaints and instructions carried by representatives to the 1789 Estates General.

39. This moment is documented in chapter 3. In Marx's case it is brief and textually thin, making it difficult to come to very clear or firm conclusions about his political (or antipolitical) views at the time, especially if we compare it with the more fulsome embrace by Engels (whose independent relationship to republicanism deserves its own study).

40. Marx and Engels, "Address of the German Democratic Communists of Brussels to Mr. Feargus O'Connor," *MEW* 4: 24-26 / *MECW* 6: 58–60.

"forces the political rule of the bourgeoisie into democratic conditions, which at every moment help the hostile classes to victory and jeopardize the very foundations of bourgeois society."[41] This position led to a lifelong opposition to forms of socialism that denied the necessity of democratic institutions and political struggle. In the *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei* they repeatedly condemned antipolitical forms of socialism, which Marx and Engels attacked for opposing republican movements campaigning for political reform and for playing into the hands of reactionary forces by "hurling the traditional anathemas . . . against representative government" (a charge that, as we will see, had in fact already been made by republicans against socialism and which Marx and Engels adopted and redirected).[42] In the IWMA, Marx and Engels continued to associate themselves with the idea that "The social emancipation of the workmen is inseparable from their political emancipation."[43] As Marx put it in a retrospective detailing the history of antipolitics in socialism, one of the most persistent errors that had dogged socialists was "preaching indifference in matters of politics."[44] Marx thus incorporated into his communism the same insistence on the need for politics that the early republican Marx had once criticized "actually existing communism" for ignoring. The communism that he and Engels forged and defended in the years before and after the 1848 Revolutions was consequently in an important sense a "republican communism."[45]

While Marx and Engels thus incorporated republican political commitments into their communism, their communism was still distinguished from republicanism by their differing social visions and account of the appropriate response to capitalism, as is charted in chapter 5.[46] At the time in which Marx

41. Marx, *Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich*, *MEGA* I.10: 148 / *MECW* 10: 79. Here as elsewhere Marx (like most of his contemporaries) refers to manhood suffrage as universal suffrage. In order to capture both their language and its exclusions, I refer to universal (manhood) suffrage throughout the book.

42. Marx and Engels, *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*, *MEW* 4: 487, 490, 492 / *MECW* 6: 511, 515, 517.

43. Marx and Engels, "Resolutions of the Conference of Delegates of the International Working Men's Association, assembled at London from 17th to 23rd September 1871," *MEGA* I.22: 342 / *MECW* 22: 426.

44. Marx, "L'indifferenza in materia politica," *MEGA* I.24: 109 / *MECW* 23: 397. A neglected essay (published in 1873 in the Italian journal *Almanacco Repubblicano*) that deserves wider notice.

45. Engels cites the use of this label in "Das Fest der Nationen in London (Zur Feier der Errichtung der französischen Republik, 22. Sept. 1792)," *MEGA* I.4: 705 / *MECW* 6: 13.

46. Marx rarely used the term "capitalism" (though not never, as it has sometimes been claimed). I use it in this book as a shorthand for Marx's more common terminology, including "capitalist mode of production" and "capitalist society."

and Engels formulated their communism, capitalist social relations were far from dominant, with proletarians—whose dispossession from the means of production meant having to work for wages for a capitalist employer—still a minority of the European working classes. Outside of Britain and a few strips of large-scale steam-powered industrial development on the continent, the overwhelming majority of workers were still artisans who were highly skilled, owned their own tools, and labored by themselves or in small workshops.[47] While Marx and Engels seized on the proletarian pockets as the harbingers of the future, republicans celebrated artisans' independence and freedom and tried to stem the growing proletarianization of the working class (and the decline of the even larger population of free peasant proprietors). Republicans consequently argued for an expansive set of social measures, from free credit to land reform, that they believed would reaffirm that independence. They thereby developed a distinct nonsocialist alternative to the unfreedom of capitalism. Marx and Engels's response to this republican social alternative focused not on its relative moral strengths, but on its historical and economic possibilities. While they agreed with parts of the republican social program, they rejected the idea that it was possible to universalize independence through an economy of small property holders, arguing that it was being steadily and irreversibly destroyed by the advance of capitalist industry. In Marx's initial responses to republicanism, he repeatedly dismissed the republican social ideal as a petty bourgeois fantasy. In his mature writings he provided a more sympathetic portrait of the lost independence of artisans and peasants, even as he continued to insist that the competitive pressures of capitalist industry made that world irretrievable.

Though Marx thus rejected the republican social ideal, his own social writings made extensive use of republican ideas to attack the unfreedom and domination of capitalism, as is discussed at the end of chapter 3 on his early economic writings and in chapter 6, which focuses on his later writings, especially *Das Kapital*. The same arguments he had raised as a young republican against the arbitrary power of monarchs and Prussian officials were brought to bear on the despots inside the factory. Being forced to work for a capitalist employer made workers "unfree" since they labored "in the service, under the domination, the coercion, and the yoke of another man."[48] The capitalist

47. Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12–20; William H. Sewell Jr., "Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1789–1848," in *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 45–70.

48. Marx, *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte*, *MEGA* I.2: 372 / *MECW* 3: 278–79.

despot faced few if any checks or controls on their arbitrary power in the workplace, and so "capital formulates its autocracy over its workers, like a private legislator and as an emanation of its own will."[49] Marx insisted that the proletarian's wage-slavery (as he and all his radical contemporaries called it) did not end with their personal domination by their individual capitalist employer. While they enjoyed the formal freedom to sell their labor power, their dispossession from the means of production meant that though they did not have to work for any particular capitalist, they did have to work for *a* capitalist. They were thus also structurally dominated by the capitalist class. That had the ideological advantage of obscuring their unfreedom: "The Roman slave was held by chains; the wage-laborer is bound to his owner by invisible threads. The appearance of independence is maintained by a constant change in the person of the individual employer."[50] Marx held that the maintenance and expansion of these forms of the capitalist's domination were critical to the operation of capitalism because of how they facilitated the exploitation of workers. But he was also keen to stress that the exploitative drive of capitalism involved a form of impersonal domination that subjected all of society, workers and capitalists, to the rule of market imperatives. Marx argued that "the immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production, which through competition dominate the individual capitalist as external coercive laws, force him to continuously expand his capital in order to keep it."[51] That incessant competitive drive prevented society from freely deciding how to make use of the immense gains of productivity. Freedom, for Marx, would consequently necessitate not only overcoming the domination of the capitalist and the capitalist class, but the domination of the market.

Marx's conversion to communism thus involved a complex mixture of incorporation and rejection of republican social and political commitments. While he opposed the republican social ideal of independent property holders, his own social critique of capitalism continued to be deeply suffused with a republican vocabulary. Politically, his critique of the emancipatory limits of a republic was matched by an equally strong commitment to its necessity for achieving socialism and his fervent opposition to antipolitical socialisms that denied it. But as critical as Marx's political incorporation of republicanism was to the formation of his communism, it was thinner than it might have been. While Marx integrated the importance of political struggle and a democratic republic into his communism, his early republican ideas emphasizing the need for far-reaching popular control and participation largely receded

49. Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. 1, *MEGA* II.6: 411 / *MECW* 35: 427.
50. Ibid., 529–30 / 573.
51. Ibid., 543 / 588.

from view. His comments on representation suggest that the institution of universal (manhood) suffrage, without further controls on representatives, would be sufficient to eventually bring the working class to power. His views on bureaucracy remained as stridently critical as in his early republican account, but they were unaccompanied by his vision of a polity wherein that bureaucracy would be replaced by popular public administration. Marx thought that the institution of democracy was critical to communism, but he did not go significantly beyond the restricted conception of what was entailed by "democracy" in a bourgeois republic. He thought at this time that it would be sufficient to come to power within the bourgeois republic and utilize its political structures for social ends, rather than communism requiring the transformation of those political structures themselves.

As is shown chapter 7, that position was shaken in March 1871, when the Parisian working class took control of their city and demanded a *social* republic. The radical democratic experiment of the Paris Commune forced Marx to reconsider the political institutions necessary for socialism. He now realized that the "working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes."[52] He recognized that the political form of bourgeois society, the bourgeois republic, was an insufficient political form for bringing about communism: "The political instrument of their [the working-class's] enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation."[53] That meant that in place of a bourgeoise republic what was needed was "a 'Social Republic,' that is, a Republic which . . . guarantees . . . social transformation by the Communal organisation."[54] That social republic would radically democratize representation and public administration through the tight control of its delegates and the deprofessionalization of the bureaucracy so that it was carried out by the citizens themselves. Legislative control and the election of public officials (with the power to recall) would transform the state's bureaucrats from "a trained caste . . . [and] haughteous masters of the people into its always removable servants."[55] Binding instructions, representative recall, and frequent elections would similarly ensure that "[i]nstead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people."[56] The resultant transformation of the state through popular control

52. Marx, *The Civil War in France*, *MEGA* I.22: 137 / *MECW* 22: 328.
53. Marx, *The Civil War in France* (*Second Draft*), *MEGA* I.22: 100 / *MECW* 22: 533.
54. Marx, *The Civil War in France* (*First Draft*), *MEGA* I.22: 64 / *MECW* 22: 497.
55. Ibid., 57 / 488.
56. Marx, *The Civil War in France*, *MEGA* I.22: 141 / *MECW* 22: 333.

and participation would provide "the Republic with the basis of really democratic institutions" and be an important component of realizing freedom, as "freedom consists in transforming the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it."[57] Thus the political institutions that had once inspired the young republican reemerged as central components of the polity that Marx thought was necessary for the realization of social emancipation. Republicanism thereby formed an integral element of his communism.

The potential influence of republicanism on Marx's thought has not gone unnoticed. In studies of republicanism, affinities to Marx have been noted in passing in the foundational works that unearthed the buried history of the tradition and established it as the thriving field of study that exists today.[58] Most of the work examining his relationship to republicanism has concentrated on his early thought where an impressive literature has charted the importance of republicanism to his critique of Hegel and the broader Young Hegelian movement (though much less attention has been paid to his republican journalism).[59] Far fewer studies have gone beyond this early period and investigated aspects of republicanism's influence on Marx's later communism.[60] There have, however, been no accounts that comprehensively examine

57. Marx, *The Civil War in France*, *MEGA* I.22: 142 / *MECW* 22: 334; "Kritik des Gothaer Programms," *MEGA* I.25: 21 / *MECW* 24: 94.

58. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 461, 505; Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 141; Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, xn3. See also Quentin Skinner, "Liberty before Liberalism and All That," *3:AM Magazine*, 18 February 2013, http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/liberty-before-liberalism-all-that/.

59. For instance, Miguel Abensour, *Democracy against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment*, trans. Max Blechman and Martin Breaugh (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); Warren Breckman, *Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 7; David Leopold, *The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human Flourishing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 4; Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Introduction," in *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin, 2002), chapter 8.

60. For republicanism and parts of Marx's political thought, see Jeffrey C. Isaac, "The Lion's Skin of Politics: Marx on Republicanism," *Polity* 23, no. 3 (1990): 461–88; Alan Gilbert, *Marx's Politics: Communists and Citizens* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981); and Norman Arthur Fischer, *Marxist Ethics within Western Political Theory: A Dialogue with Republicanism, Communitarianism, and Liberalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). For the influence on his social thought, see William Clare Roberts, *Marx's Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); and Michael J. Thompson, "The Radical

the enduring influence of republicanism on Marx's social and political thought across his writings.

Given the enormous quantities of ink that have been and continue to be devoted to Marx, that absence is more than surprising.[61] Part of the explanation has to lie in the continued invisibility of republicanism as a living political movement in the nineteenth century. The histories that have so powerfully revived the tradition have rarely ventured into the long century after 1776 and 1789. In Alex Gourevitch's corrective study of nineteenth-century American labor republicans, he observes that the "prevailing historical scholarship" gives "the strong impression that nothing conceptually meaningful happened in the republican tradition after the American Revolution."[62] Melvin L. Rogers, in his rehabilitation of nineteenth-century African American republicans, similarly notes how their exclusion has helped sustain the "troublesome interpretative claim . . . that by the nineteenth century, republicanism was in retreat or already eclipsed."[63] The consequence of this interpretive assumption has been that when republicanism is considered in relation to Marx's thought, it has often been reduced simply to support for a nonmonarchical political regime or as a dead political language from the Classical or Renaissance world. Republicanism's status as an active ideological and political competitor is rarely properly appreciated.[64] That means that republicanism has often not been given its due, even in studies that have otherwise provided an enviably careful and comprehensive reconstruction of Marx's thought.[65]

My hope is that by considering Marx in the light of republicanism, we might be able to move further past a number of interpretative commonplaces

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Republican Structure of Marx's Critique of Capitalist Society," *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 47, no. 3 (2019): 391–409.

61. Of the 115 combined entries in two recent compendiums on Marx, not a single one is dedicated to republicanism. See Jeff Diamanti, Andrew Pendakis, and Imre Szeman, eds., *The Bloomsbury Companion to Marx* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019); and Matt Vidal et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

62. Alex Gourevitch, *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9.

63. Melvin L. Rogers, *The Darkened Light of Faith: Race, Democracy, and Freedom in African American Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023), 102.

64. Roberts's contextual study of Marx's *Das Kapital* is a laudable exception; see *Marx's Inferno*, 1–9.

65. I am here thinking particularly of the still unsurpassed works by Richard N. Hunt, *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels*, 2 vols. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974, 1984) and Hal Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution*, 5 vols. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977–2005).

that, despite the efforts of these more careful interpreters, continue to dog assessments of Marx's thought, particularly the idea that he was not committed to politics, democracy, or freedom. Marx has often filled a convenient position in narratives that criticize the decline of politics in socialist or more broadly modern political thought. Hannah Arendt provided an influential portrait of Marx when she condemned him for his supposed "repugnance to the public realm," his "obsession with the social question and his unwillingness to pay serious attention to the questions of state and government."[66] Sheldon Wolin similarly presented Marx as part of a century of thought that "was nearly unanimous in its contempt for politics."[67] More recently, Axel Honneth has squeezed Marx into a single monolithic socialist tradition that "simply ignored the entire sphere of political deliberation," failed to appreciate the value of "democratic popular rule," and was thus left with an "inadequate understanding of politics."[68] The irony of many of these judgments is that they would function better as a description of the antipolitical forms of socialism that Marx tried to displace. A study of Marx and republicanism helps show that one of Marx's great contributions was to place politics (and especially democratic politics) at the heart of socialism. I also hope that it reveals Marx to have been more interested in political and constitutional questions than the usual caricature of his work would suggest. I do not, of course, pretend that this study alone could dislodge the Cold War–inflected picture of Marx as a totalitarian antidemocrat. But I do hope that it will be harder to maintain that "Marx was not committed to democracy at all."[69]

Finally, it is still not adequately appreciated that Marx's principal political value was freedom, rather than, say, equality or community. As a young journalist, he keenly observed that "Freedom is so much the essence of man, that even its enemies implement it while combating its reality. . . . No man combats freedom; at most he combats the freedom of others."[70] That commitment to freedom, and antipathy to those who would deny it to others, motivated his social and political thought and activism throughout his life. Where Marx's commitment to freedom is acknowledged, it is usually reduced to an endorsement of

66. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998 [1958]), 165; Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1990 [1963]), 258.

67. Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016 [1960]), 323.

68. Axel Honneth, *The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal*, trans. Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 26, 32–33.

69. Allan Megill, *Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason (Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market)* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 117.

70. Marx, "Debatten über Preßfreiheit," *MEGA* I.1: 143 / *MECW* 1: 155.

some conception of positive freedom as self-realization or fulfilment.[71] I do not mean to deny that such conceptions evidently played a role in Marx's thought (Marx, like most people, had more than one conception of freedom). But I do think that the role played by republican freedom has been neglected.[72] A concern expressed across his writings was that people were unfree when they were dominated—subjected to arbitrary power that they did not control—an unfreedom that Marx believed capitalism and its imitation of democracy inflicted upon the immense majority.

In order to bring these contributions and republican commitments to the fore, I have tried to reconstruct what republicanism meant at the time of Marx's political engagement. As was discussed above, this period barely features, if at all, in histories of republicanism, or its existence is even actively denied. Accounts often begin with either the ancient Greek or Roman Republics, then skip over nearly a thousand years to the renaissance Italian city-states, then jump to the English commonwealth of the seventeenth century, and finally conclude with the American Revolution in the late eighteenth century (with lip service sometimes paid to the French Revolution).[73] That narrative timeline already problematically excludes, for instance, the way in which republicanism was appropriated and reshaped in the Haitian Revolution.[74] Moreover, that narrative is frequently accompanied by claims that republicanism disappeared in the nineteenth century, having supposedly "been largely

71. For instance, Allen Wood, *Karl Marx*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 48–54; Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 53. But see also Berlin's more inadvertently compelling description of Marxian freedom as not wanting to be "ruled by foreign masters . . . or . . . classes" (ibid., 45).

72. See, however, William Clare Roberts, "Marx's Social Republic: Political Not Metaphysical," *Historical Materialism* 27, no. 2 (2019): 41–58. For a response from the perspective of positive freedom, see Paul Raekstad, *Karl Marx's Realist Critique of Capitalism: Freedom, Alienation, and Socialism* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 61–62, 130–31.

73. For a typical example, see Pettit, *Republicanism*, 19; and Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit, "Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 12.

74. For this complex process, see Laurent Dubois, "Our Three Colors: The King, the Republic and the Political Culture of Slave Revolution in Saint-Domingue," *Historical Reflections* 29, no. 1 (2003): 83–102; Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), chs. 7–8; Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Black Spartacus: The Epic Life of Toussaint Louverture* (London: Allen Lane, 2020), 8–12, 39–40, 65–66, 99–100, 123–26, 154–57, 357–58. On republicanism in the French Caribbean more broadly at the time, see Laurent Dubois, "Republican Antiracism and Racism: A Caribbean Genealogy," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 18, no. 3 (2000): 5–17; Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

overtaken by liberalism."[75] Yet, as Rachel Hammersley writes in her exceptional recent history of republicanism, that narrative is simply "false," and she urges a greater focus on nineteenth-century republicanism, since the tradition was "transformed during this period from a doctrine primarily articulated by political elites to one that appealed to artisans, workers, and, by the 1870s, even women and newly enfranchised former slaves."[76] By examining the republicanism of nineteenth-century Europe in relation to Marx, this book has the subsidiary aim of helping to resurrect its overlooked place in the larger history of the republican tradition.[77]

## Republicanism in Nineteenth-Century Europe

In 1831, Félicité de Lamennais, the onetime ultramontane priest turned liberal Catholic, observed that "the word republic . . . by its vague meaning, is marvellously suitable to incite the most opposed passions." Yet he maintained that a general definition of a republic was possible as a regime that "excludes the absolute authority of one person, and places the right of legislation in the whole people, or in a part of the people." Following a categorization going back to Montesquieu, Lamennais labeled the former regime a "democratic republic" and the latter an "aristocratic republic." Under this definition, Lamennais concluded that France's recently established liberal July Monarchy was actually a republic, since, though it had a king, "ultimate authority" rested in the legislature and hence the people who controlled it.[78] Implicit but left

75. Eric MacGilvray, "Republicanism," in *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, ed. Michael T. Gibbons, vol. 7 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 3235. See also Skinner's claim that during the nineteenth century the republican view of liberty "increasingly slipped from sight," *Liberty before Liberalism*, ix.

76. Rachel Hammersley, *Republicanism: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), 174.

77. My focus is on the European republicanism that Marx most directly encountered. For studies of nineteenth-century republicanism in, for instance, the Americas and the Middle East, see José Antonio Aguilar and Rafael Rojas, eds., *El republicanismo en Hispanoamérica: Ensayos de historia intelectual y política* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2002); Gabriel Entin, "Catholic Republicanism: The Creation of the Spanish American Republics during Revolution," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 79, no. 1 (2018): 105–23; Roberto Gargarella, "Elections, Republicanism, and the Demands of Democracy: A View from the Americas," in *Comparative Election Law*, ed. James A. Gardner (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2022), 236–49; Banu Turnaoğlu, *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), chapter 3.

78. F. de La Mennais, "De la République," *L'Avenir* (9 March 1831), in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 10 (Paris: Paul Daubrée et Cailleux, 1836–37), 269–70/"On the Republic," in *Lamennais: A Believer's Revolutionary Politics*, ed. and trans. Richard A. Lebrun, Sylvain Milbach, and Jerry Ryan (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 79–80.

unsaid in Lamennais's argument was that the July Monarchy was consequently an aristocratic republic, as only a tiny part of the people, men who met the requisite property threshold (less than 0.5% of the population), could vote in national elections. Lamennais's intervention was partly directed at more conservative liberals (he pushed for extending the franchise to all men except those who "have a dependent position"),[79] as well as republicans still smarting from their failure to institute a republic in the 1830 Revolution. Lamennais's more encompassing definition of a republic was deliberately meant to run against the increasing conflation of a republic with a democratic regime with universal (manhood) suffrage.[80] While republics—and republicanism—had in previous centuries often been associated with various mixed forms of government (combining monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy), republicanism in nineteenth-century Europe was firmly democratic.[81]

Republicanism and democracy were so tightly associated in the nineteenth century that the labels "republican" and "democrat" were used largely interchangeably. Republicans often preferred to refer to themselves as "democrats," or "radicals," the other popular synonym, which avoided the dangers of a direct attack on royal authority.[82] (One reason perhaps for the continued invisibility

79. Ibid., 277 / 83. The subsequent 19 April 1831 election law lowered (but did not remove) the property franchise (to 200 francs in taxes) for national elections, increasing the existing voting population by 50% to some 160,000 men, at that time 0.5% of the population; see Malcolm Crook, *How the French Learned to Vote: A History of Electoral Practice in France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 29–30, 235.

80. For this change in meaning, see Wolfgang Mager, "Republik," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984), 618–19.

81. Insofar as the mixed constitution continued to be defended in the nineteenth century it was by liberals; see Uwe Backes, *Liberalismus und Demokratie—Antinomie und Synthese: Zum Wechselverhältnis zweier politischer Strömungen im Vormärz* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2000), 123–50. For an attempt to distinguish between an "Italian-Atlantic" and a "Franco-German" republicanism, respectively committed to a mixed constitution versus democratic popular sovereignty, see Philip Pettit, "Two Republican Traditions," in *Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics*, ed. Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 169–204. That stylized distinction, however, has little purchase in the nineteenth century. For a convincing argument that democracy was more prominent in earlier forms of republicanism than often assumed, see Annelien De Dijn, "Democratic Republicanism in the Early Modern Period," in *Rethinking Liberty before Liberalism*, ed. Hannah Dawson and Annelien De Dijn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 100–116.

82. Maurice Agulhon, *The Republican Experiment, 1848–1850*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 14; Stephan Walter, *Demokratisches Denken zwischen Hegel und Marx: Die politische Philosophie Arnold Ruges; Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Demokratie in*

of the tradition in the nineteenth century). Nineteenth-century republicans did tend to be "republicans" in the narrow sense of antimonarchism, but they insisted that it was not a core or even a necessary component of their republicanism. In 1819, Richard Carlile (while imprisoned for publishing the works of Thomas Paine) defended changing the title of his magazine to *The Republican*, because the "etymology and meaning of the word Republican" showed that "it really means nothing more when applied to government, than a government which consults the public interest—the interest of the whole people." While it was true that "in almost all instances where governments have been denominated Republican, monarchy has been practically abolished; yet it does not argue the necessity of abolishing monarchy to establish a Republican government." What mattered to Carlile was being ruled by a parliament "possessing a Democratic ascendancy, renewed every year," and the extension of "the suffrage of representation to every man." A "real Republican government" would then be free to decide whether it wanted to keep "the present system of hereditary monarchy."[83]

Republicans' commitment to democracy flowed from one of their most central values: popular sovereignty. The 1843 opening editorial of *La Réforme*, which would become one of France's two main republican newspapers, addressed itself to "all friends of progress and liberty" and declared that "Our goal is to demand and pursue, until satisfaction, the full and genuine implementation of the principle of the Sovereignty of the People."[84] The opening 1848 editorial of the English Chartist journal *The Republican* (subtitled *A Magazine Advocating the Sovereignty of the People*) similarly argued that "the foundation of all Liberty" rested on the principle "That the voice of the People is the only legitimate source of supreme authority: in a word, we desire to see acknowledged everywhere, the Sovereignty of the People."[85] A few months later, the election platform of German republicans for the 1848 Frankfurt National

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*Deutschland* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1995), 51–52; Peter Wende, *Radikalismus im Vormärz: Untersuchungen zur politischen Theorie der frühen deutschen Demokratie* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1975), 8. Engels argued that "The English Chartist is politically a republican, though he rarely or never mentions the word . . . and calls himself in preference a democrat"; see *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, *MEGA* I.4: 441 / *MECW* 4: 518.

83. R[ichard] Carlile, "To the Readers of the Republican," *The Republican*, vol. 1 (London, 1819): ix. For the history of the association of a "republic" with only nonmonarchical regimes, see James Hankins, "Exclusivist Republicanism and the Non-Monarchical Republic," *Political Theory* 38, no. 4 (2010): 452–82.

84. "La Réforme," *La Réforme*, no. 1 (29 July 1843): 1. The other being *Le National*, the organ of bourgeois republicanism; see Agulhon, *The Republican Experiment*, 17.

85. [C. G. Harding], "Introductory," *The Republican: A Magazine Advocating the Sovereignty of the People* (London: J. Watson, 1848), 1.

Assembly promised to "*establish freedom*" through new institutions "which will preserve sovereignty with the people for all time."[86]

"Universal suffrage" was republicanism's core institutional demand for the realization of popular sovereignty. For most republicans, universal suffrage actually meant "manhood suffrage," the expansion of the franchise to all adult men through the removal of property and educational qualifications.[87] Republicans rarely included women in this ideal of expanded political suffrage. As Whitney Walton has shown, that was also true of some of the most prominent French republican women, such as George Sand and Marie d'Agoult. While they challenged patriarchal ideals of republican motherhood, where women's only political role was to rear male citizens in the home, and though they advocated radical reforms to marriage, divorce, education, and employment to promote women's social and civil equality, they stopped short of endorsing women's political enfranchisement.[88] Yet a few republicans did take the "universal" in universal suffrage seriously and defended women's inclusion in the franchise. Amalie Struve, after being imprisoned and forced to flee into exile for her role in trying to bring about a German democratic republic in the 1848 Revolutions, subsequently chastised her fellow republicans for "excluding women from universal suffrage," demanding "on what grounds can man, who has put liberty, equality and fraternity on his banner, make women more unfree than the most unfree subject of some prince?"[89]

86. [Arnold Ruge], *Motivirtes Manifest der Radical-democratischen Partei in der constituir: Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main* ([1848]), 2 [n.p.].

87. A perspective missing in Pierre Rosanvallon, "The Republic of Universal Suffrage," in *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 192–205. See, in contrast, Siân Reynolds, "Marianne's Citizens? Women, the Republic and Universal Suffrage in France," in *Women, State and Revolution: Essays on Power and Gender in Europe since 1789*, ed. Siân Reynolds (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 102–22.

88. Whitney Walton, *Eve's Proud Descendants: Four Women Writers and Republican Politics in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), chapters 5–7, esp. pp. 227–33.

89. Amalie Struve, "Die Stellung der Frauen im Leben," *Deutscher Zuschauer*, no. 25 (31 December 1851): 198–99, reproduced in *Frauenrechte sind Menschenrechte! Schriften der Lehrerin, Revolutionärin und Literarin Amalie Struve*, ed. Monica Marcello-Müller (Herbolzheim: Centaurus Verlag, 2002), 68–69. See further Marion Freund, "Amalie Struve (1824–1862): Revolutionärin und Schriftstellerin—ihr doppelter Kampf um Freiheits- und Frauenrechte," in *Akteure eines Umbruchs: Männer und Frauen der Revolution von 1848/49*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Fides, 2007), 689–732. Amalie Struve's feminist republicanism can be contrasted with Emma Herwegh's contemporaneous republicanism that was largely uninterested in women's emancipation; see Marion Freund, "Emma Herwegh (1817–1904): Ein Leben für die Freiheit 'als das Einzige, was des Kampfes wert ist,'" in *Akteure eines Umbruchs*, 3: 278–79.

Few republicans, however, believed that extension of the franchise (whether male or female) was sufficient for real democracy and popular sovereignty. Their reading of Rousseau (who continued to be nineteenth-century republicans' principal intellectual influence) left them suspicious of representatives. They consequently understood representation as a kind of delegation, where representatives (or delegates) were to be closely watched and controlled by the citizens who elected them. Concretely that might involve annual elections (as with Carlile and the Chartists who followed him), binding instructions for delegates (known as an imperative mandate), and/or the power to recall delegates. An 1845 manifesto of the republicans associated with *La Réforme*, for instance, maintained that "Those who govern, in a well-constituted democracy, are only the mandatories of the people, they therefore must be responsible and revocable."[90]

Some further believed (again drawing on an understanding of Rousseau, as well as the unrealized 1793 Jacobin constitution) that such delegates would need to be paired with institutions realizing "the direct sovereignty of the people," in which citizens gathered in primary assemblies would play a role in the formation and/or ratification of laws.[91] The necessity for democracy and civic participation was also, for some republicans, not limited to legislation but extended to public administration. Johann Georg Wirth proposed making "all public officials elected *by all and from all the citizens* of the state, directly accountable to the people and dismissible by the same," with the result that the functions of professional state officials would be "passed to citizens, who perform this service alternating in turns."[92] The 1847 Offenburger program, which helped seal the divide between German republicans and liberals ahead of the impending revolution, demanded, alongside a call for democratic representation, "a popular state administration," in which "The over-government of officials is replaced by the self-administration of the people.'[93] Few republicans

90. "Aux démocrates," *La Réforme* (15 July 1845): 1.

91. Julius Fröbel, *Grundzüge zu einer RepublikanischenVerfassung für Deutschland* (Mannheim: Heinrich Hoff, 1848), 7–8; [Alexandre] Ledru-Rollin, *Plus de président, plus de représantants* (Paris: Bureau de la Voix du Proscrit, 1851); [W. J. Linton], "Direct Sovereignty of the People," *The English Republic* (1851), 1: 233–42. See further Anne-Sophie Chombost, "Socialist Visions of Direct Democracy: The Mid-Century Crisis of Popular Sovereignty and the Constitutional Legacy of the Jacobins," in *The 1848 Revolutions and European Political Thought*, ed. Douglas Moggach and Gareth Stedman Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 94–119.

92. J. G. A. Wirth, *Die Rechte des deutschen Volkes: Eine Vertheidigungsrede vor den Assisen zu Landau* (Nancy, 1833), 47, 57–58.

93. "Die Forderungen des Volkes" (1848), Article 12, reproduced in *Menschenrechte und Geschichte: Die 13 Offenburger Forderungen des Volkes von 1847*, eds. Sylvia Schraut, et al. (Stuttgart: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, 2015), 12–13 / "Offenburg Programme

of the nineteenth century would thus have been satisfied with what passes for "democracy" today.

Next to popular sovereignty and democracy, core concepts of nineteenth-century republicanism were the trinity of values inherited from the French Revolution: *liberty*, *equality*, and *fraternity*. In republican thought this cluster of concepts was closely interwoven and justified in terms of each other, as is particularly clear from the above cited 1845 manifesto in *La Réforme*, which argued that "A democratic government is one which has the sovereignty of the people as its principle, universal suffrage as its origin and as its goal the realization of the formula: liberty, equality, fraternity."[94] Liberty has long been rightly recognized as a core concept of republicanism, but nineteenth-century republicanism was also distinguished by its inclusion of equality and fraternity.[95] Equality, for instance, meant that liberty had to be universalized and not the exclusive privilege of small set of citizens, a feature that nineteenth-century European republicans believed blighted not only the monarchies they opposed but aristocratic and slave-based republics. As Linton argued, in Athens "[t]here was liberty, but not *equality*," and in the American republic, "Freedom is not universal; equality does not exist."[96] Equality was understood to ground not only civic and political rights for all (including the extension of suffrage),[97] but to include the requisite material equality to avoid dependency (without thereby, they argued, going over to "the equal condition of all men—as dreamed of by some of the Socialists").[98]

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of South-West German Democrats, 10 September 1847," in John Breuilly, *Austria, Prussia and the Making of Germany 1806–1871*, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), Document 29, pp. 138–39.

94. "Aux démocrates," *La Réforme* (15 July 1845): 1. For the general importance of understanding ideologies in terms of the organization of concepts, see Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 85–87.

95. Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Intellectual Founders of the Republic: Five Studies in Nineteenth-Century French Republican Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19–20. See also Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 80.

96. [W. J. Linton], "Democracy and Republicanism," *The English Republic* (1854), 4: 65; see also "Liberty and Equality," *The English Republic* (1854), 3: 121–32. For the emergence of equality in modern republican thought and its complex inclusion (and exclusion) in American republicanism, see Gourevitch, *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth*, chapter 1.

97. See, for instance, the linking of equality to universal suffrage in Bronterre O'Brien's editorial note in *Buonarroti's History of Babeuf's Conspiracy for Equality* (London: H. Heatherington, 1836), 214n.

98. Linton, "Republican Principles," 110; see also [W. J. Linton], "A Republican Catechism," *The English Republic* (1851), 1: 145–49.

Now attached to an ideal of equality, liberty continued to be a core concept of republicanism in the nineteenth century. As was suggested in the republican defenses of popular sovereignty cited above, republicans understood freedom to be essentially connected with democracy. In an 1834 essay, "De l'absolutisme et de la liberté," Félicité de Lamennais (by now alienated from both the Catholic Church and the liberal July Monarchy and on his way to being probably the most widely read and translated republican of the 1830s and 1840s)[99] gave the following definition: "Personal liberty, or the right to live and act freely, implies the absence of any will, of any power which would impose arbitrary limits on this same liberty, that is to say, it implies the cooperation of each member of society in the law that governs society."[100] Freedom for Lamennais was thus the absence of arbitrary power, where that meant not being subjected to the will of another and instead having democratic control over the laws to which one was subject. This was a view of freedom that Lamennais repeatedly defended. A few months later, in his *Paroles d'un croyant* (*Words of a Believer*), which Christopher Clark aptly describes as "a global literary sensation,"[101] Lamennais rejected the liberal pretensions to freedom of the July Monarchy, demanding of his readers, "Are you the one who has chosen those who govern you, who command you to do this and not to do that . . . ? And if it is not you, how are you free?"[102]

The unearthing of the distinctiveness (and critical potential) of this republican conception of liberty has been one of the central contributions of the modern revival of republicanism.[103] Republican liberty differs from a number of influential alternative conceptions of freedom. It can be contrasted with so-called positive views of freedom, where freedom consists in mastering one's internal irrational desires. It is also crucially distinguished from *freedom as*

99. For Lamennais's three-part political journey, see Sylvain Milbach, "Introduction," in *Lamennais: A Believer's Revolutionary Politics*, 2–12.

100. F. de la Mennais, "De l'absolutisme et de la liberté: Dialoghetti," *Reveu des deux mondes*, vol. 3 (1 August 1834): 302. See the translations, *Absolutismus und Freiheit: Dialoghetti* (Bern: J. J. Burgdorfer, 1834); *Dell'assolutismo e della libertà: Dialoghetti* (Italia: 1834), n.p.; "Del absolutismo y de la libertad," in *Palabras de un creyente* (Paris: Rosa, 1834), 277–335; "Absolutism and Liberty," [trans. Orestes Brownson], *The Boston Reformer,* vol. 3, no. 71 (13 September 1836): 1; and *El absolutismo y la Libertad* (Barcelona: F. Sanchez, 1843).

101. Christopher Clark, *Revolutionary Spring: Fighting for a New World, 1848–1849* (London: Penguin, 2023), 132.

102. Lamennais, *Paroles d'un croyant* (Paris: Eugène Renduel, 1834), 104–5 / *Words of a Believer* (New York: Charles de Behr, 1834), 96; and *Lamennais: A Believer's Revolutionary Politics*, 150.

103. Thanks especially to the foundational work by Phillip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, in, for instance, Pettit, *Republicanism* and Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*. Its continued importance to nineteenth-century republicanism has so far, however, been insufficiently realized.

*noninterference* (often referred to as negative freedom), under which someone is considered free insofar as they are not interfered with. Republican freedom as the absence of arbitrary power (or as it is also known, *freedom as nondomination*) requires more than this. Under republican liberty, you are unfree even when no one actually interferes with you, if a master retains the arbitrary capacity to interfere with you (arbitrary in the sense that that they can interfere according to their own pleasure rather than according to rules that you control). It is thus domination and not interference that compromises liberty for republicans. Domination matters for republicans, because of how arbitrary power forces those subject to it to contort themselves and their character in order to please or placate their dominator. That remains a concern even when a particular master is well disposed and rarely if ever interferes with those they dominate. For republicans, the servant, slave, or subject of a benevolent master is as unfree as someone who lives under a cruel or despotic one. What matters is not the character, the good or bad will, of the dominator but that they are, regardless of their individual disposition, in a position of domination over someone. Arbitrary power thus cannot be addressed through better or kinder masters and rulers, but has to be rendered nonarbitrary through rules that are controlled by those subjected to that power.

The importance of that insight had long been recognized in the republican tradition and continued to be defended in the nineteenth century—often by reference to those older examples. As Linton argued in his 1854 essay on "Slavery and Freedom":

> Hear what that truest freeman and noble servant of his country even unto death,—hear what Algernon Sidney said of Slavery: "The weight of chains, number of stripes, hardness of labour, and other effects of a master's cruelty, may make one servitude more miserable than another; but he is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst, if he *must* obey his commands and depend upon his will."[104]

Algernon Sidney's classic seventeenth-century depiction of the nature of freedom and slavery was one of the most influential statements of the

104. [W. J. Linton], "Slavery and Freedom," *The English Republic* (1854), 3: 90 (see also, however, Linton's attempt to combine this with a positive conception of liberty [ibid., 83]). Linton's citation slightly alters the final line, which in the original reads ". . . and he does serve him if he must obey his commands and depend upon his will": Algernon Sidney, *Discourses Concerning Government*, ed. Thomas G. West (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, [1698]1990), ch. III.21. Linton used the same extract from Sidney as the epigraph to "Republican Measures," *The English Republic* (1851), 1: 121 and as a standalone definition of "Slavery" in *The National: A Library for the People*, ed. W. J. Linton (London: J. Watson, 1839), 214. See also the discussion in Stuart White, "The Republican Critique of Capitalism," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 14, no. 5 (2011): 566.

republican complaint against arbitrary power.[105] Sidney also provided one of the quintessential definitions of republican freedom, arguing that "liberty solely consists in an independency upon the will of another, and by the name of slave we understand a man, who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all at the will of his master," and he insisted that this required a person to be "governed only by laws of their own making."[106] For Sidney, this idea grounded a critique of absolute monarchy for making the people slaves of an arbitrary ruler, but where "the people" was understood as an independent, propertied male elite.[107] When Linton employed Sidney's definition, a hundred fifty years later, it served not only a more democratic political purpose (Linton argued that the "[w]orking men of England, *for* whom but not *by* whom the laws are made . . . are slaves"), but also as an indictment of the social dependency of women, as marriage forced them to "surrender the natural right of sovereignty and stoop to be the property and possession of their lords," and of workers, as the "arbitrary threats of hunger" meant that they were "under the power of another class of men who dispose of them as they think fit."[108] As Alex Gourevitch has shown, American labor republicans continued to use Sidney—against Sidney's own elitist intentions—to make this social critique into the late nineteenth century.[109]

Much of Linton's argument was reliant on that made by Lamennais in his hugely popular 1839 pamphlet *De l'esclavage Moderne* (*On Modern Slavery*), which Linton translated into English.[110] Lamennais made the established

105. For the use of Sidney in contemporary republican theory, see Pettit, *Republicanism*, 34; Philip Pettit, *Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 28; and Frank Lovett, *A General Theory of Domination and Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 153.

106. Sidney, *Discourses Concerning Government*, I.5.

107. For Sidney's complex democratic and anti-democratic themes, see Tom Ashby, "Democracy in Algernon Sidney's *Discourses Concerning Government*," in *Republicanism and Democracy: Close Friends?*, ed. Skadi Siiri Krause and Dirk Jörke (Cham: Springer, 2023), 81–111.

108. Linton, "Slavery and Freedom," 90–91. Despite Linton's reference here to the political exclusion of "working men," he defended women's suffrage; see W. J. Linton, "Universal Suffrage: The Principle of the People's Charter," in *The Republican: A Magazine Advocating the Sovereignty of the People* (London: J. Watson, 1848), 165–68.

109. Gourevitch, *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth*, 14–16, 103.

110. *De l'esclavage moderne* went through five editions in France within a year, as well as editions printed in Belgium and Switzerland. Translations swiftly followed into English, *Modern Slavery*, trans. William James Linton (London: J. Watson, 1840); German, *Die moderne Sklaverei,* trans. J. Eckenstein (Weissenburg: n.p., 1840); three separate Spanish editions, e.g., *La esclavitud moderna*, trans. Adriano (Barcelona: Mata y de Rodalles, 1840); Portuguese, *A escravidão moderna*, trans. João Maria Nogueira (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional 1845); and later into Italian, *Della schiavitù moderna* (Milan: Robecchi Levino, 1862), and Dutch, *De slavernij van heden* (The

republican point that the French people were "politically enslaved" since they lived "under the domination . . . [of] their lords and masters who pay 200 francs in taxes, [who] alone are invested with the right to participate in the making of laws, disposing of them, their persons, their freedom, and their goods, according to their own caprices."[111] But what made Lamennais's pamphlet so explosive was the social extension he made to this argument. In one of the earliest definitions of "proletarians" as "those who, possessing nothing, live uniquely by their labor," Lamennais argued that their reliance on wages to survive made proletarians "dependent on the capitalist, irresistibly his subject, for in the purse of one is the life of the other." This dependency meant that between "the capitalist and the proletarian, therefore, almost the same actual relations exist as between the master and the slave in ancient societies." Though proletarians enjoyed the freedom to sell their labor, which Lamennais considered "an immense advantage over the ancient slave," the proletarian's dependency on a capitalist meant that "this freedom is only fictitious."[112] (Nowhere in Lamennais's discussion of the "modern slavery" of wage-labor does he acknowledge that "ancient" chattel slavery was still very much in existence, including in France's colonies).[113]

For Lamennais the answer to the proletarian's political and social slavery was unequivocal: it required the extension of both the franchise and property to all, as "liberty depends on two linked, inseparable conditions, property and participation in government." At the same time, Lamennais insisted that the socialist and communist alternative of abolishing private property through state-ownership would not result not in "universal liberty" but in the "universal

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Hague: Liebers, 1885). Spanish translations were also printed in Chile, *De la esclavitud moderna*, trans. Francisco Bilbao (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Liberal, 1843), and Uruguay, *De la esclavitud moderna*, trans. D. M. Paler (Montevideo: Imprenta del 18 de Julio, 1847). For the influence of Lamennais's pamphlet in Chile, see James A. Wood, *The Society of Equality: Popular Republicanism and Democracy in Santiago de Chile, 1818–1851* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011), 136, 159–67.

111. F. Lamennais, *De l'esclavage moderne* (Paris: Pagnerre, 1839), 60–61 / *Modern Slavery*, 16.

112. Ibid., 30–36 / 9–10. See also the translation in *Lamennais: A Believer's Revolutionary Politics*, 279–98, and the discussion in Michael Löwy, "Peuple réveille-toi! Lamennais, critique de l'esclavage capitaliste," in *De l'esclavage moderne*, by Félicité Robert de Lamennais (Paris: Passager clandestin, 2009), 11–22.

113. For the often purely metaphorical role of chattel slavery in republican discussions of liberty, rather than the actual experience or writings of the enslaved, see Alan Coffee, "A Radical Revolution in Thought: Frederick Douglass on the Slave's Perspective on Republican Freedom," in *Radical Republicanism: Recovering the Tradition's Popular Heritage*, ed. Bruno Leipold, Karma Nabulsi, and Stuart White (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 47–64.

slavery" of a dominating state power.[114] The republican conception of freedom thus grounded the republican's defense of political democracy and their (non-socialist) alternative to capitalism.

The republican conception of freedom also implied a special understanding of the relationship of liberty to law. Under a freedom as noninterference view, coercive laws by definition limit freedom (even if they might increase the overall amount of liberty). But if liberty means the absence of arbitrary interference, then interference that is not arbitrary does not undermine freedom. That implies the possibility that being subjected to a law might not necessarily make one unfree but in fact constitute one's freedom.[115] As Lamennais argued, "far from destroying or altering primitive liberty, the law is merely the exercise of this liberty." But critical to this argument, for Lamennais and republicans generally, was that it was only law of a particular kind that did not infringe liberty, that is, when "the general will . . . the will of the people . . . constitutes the law." In clear debt to Rousseau, Lamennais argued that it was possible to maintain our individual liberty in society through the creation of a "collective sovereignty of all or the sovereignty of the people," in which the laws which govern the people are "rules which they impose on themselves."[116] With that democratic condition in place, and only then, does the law not undermine freedom. As Karl Heinzen argued, "Law is only law when it is the rightful expression of those who are subjected to it. Law is the general guideline of the expressed will of free citizens, who voluntarily obey it."[117] Freedom as the absence of arbitrary power, as it was understood by republicans, meant not simply being subject to the rule of law but that the law had to be democratically controlled by the people.[118]

114. F. Lamennais, *Du passé et de l'avenir du peuple* (Paris: Pagnerre, 1841), 140–41, 152–53 / *Words of a Believer and the Past and Future of the People*, trans. L. E. Martineau (London: Chapman and Hall, 1891), 188, 193–94. For Lamennais's account that freedom required not just the franchise but also that representatives were tightly controlled, see *De l'esclavage modern*, 88–92 / 23–24.

115. For the theoretical argument behind this idea, see Pettit, *Republicanism*, 65–66; Philip Pettit, "Law and Liberty," in *Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives*, ed. Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39–59.

116. F. Lamennais, *Le livre du peuple* (Paris: H. Delloye & V. Lecou, 1838), 73–74 / *The Book of the People*, trans. J. H. Lorymer (London: H. Heatherington, 1838), 32–33.

117. K. Heinzen, *Eine Mahnung an die teutschen Liberalen* (Herisan: Literarischen Institutes, 1846), 36–37.

118. Thus, in addition to republican freedom differing from freedom as noninterference, it also differs from a narrower conception of arbitrary power, where that means simply being subject to consistent rules, even if one has no hand in the making of those rules. For this reason, Pettit has subsequently clarified that republican freedom is better understood as an opposition

Republicans' inclusion of democracy in their conception of freedom marked a clear divide with liberals. Arnold Ruge argued that "liberalism . . . [was] completely mistaken about the concept of freedom," which required that the "laws of free beings had to be their own product."[119] While liberals and republicans overlapped in some regards, including an opposition to arbitrary feudal institutions and the introduction of civic freedoms, democracy was the Rubicon that liberals were unwilling to cross.[120] Nineteenth-century liberals believed in the importance of representative government, but rejected extending the suffrage to all, maintaining that political participation should be limited to the capable through property and educational qualifications on the vote.[121] As one influential 1840 encyclopedia entry on liberalism put it, the "true essence of freedom" did not require "unmediated rule of the people," and insisted that the "reasonable liberal does not at all demand that affairs of state are decided by unmediated universal suffrage," as this would be "destructive, constantly leading back to the original state of civil society."[122]

The importance of democracy to delineating these political formations can also be seen in the three main competing political regimes of nineteenth-century Europe: absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and a democratic republic (see figure 2).[123] (This tripartite classification, as we will see, plays an

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to "uncontrolled interference" rather than the potentially misleading "arbitrary interference"; see *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 58. For an account of the centrality of this aspect to republican (or democratic) freedom to which I am indebted, see Annelien De Dijn, *Freedom: An Unruly History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020).

119. Arnold Ruge, "Vorwort: Eine Selbstkritik des Liberalismus," *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, no. 1 (2 January 1843): 4; "A Self-Critique of Liberalism," *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich (Amherst: Humanity, 1983), 245. As I argue in chapter 1, liberals in this period (at least in Germany) were more likely to defend a nondemocratic version of freedom as nondomination, rather than necessarily freedom as noninterference.

120. Jeremy Jennings, "Early Nineteenth-century Liberalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, ed. George Klosko (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 331; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 416–17.

121. Alan S. Kahan, *Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Political Culture of Limited Suffrage* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

122. [Paul von] Pfizer, "Liberal, Liberalismus," in *Staats-Lexikon oder Encylopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, ed. Carl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcker, vol. 9 (Altona: Johann Friedrich Hammerich, 1840), 719.

123. David Blackbourn, *The Fontana History of Germany 1780–1918: The Long Nineteenth Century* (London: Fontana Press, 1997), 130–34; Clark, *Revolutionary Spring*, 109–29; Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, 56–57.




FIGURE 2. Unknown artist, *Die Zeitungs-Politiker* (*The Newspaper Politicians*) (1850). Courtesy of Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel: Graph. C: 215. The illustration depicts the three main political factions at the time: "The Radical/Republican," "The Liberal/Constitutionalist," and "The Conservative/Absolute Monarchist." Compare this with a contemporaneous view from Britain, which appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* (July 1851): "It is seen that, within 40 years, the *Royalists* have fallen before the *Liberals*—the *Liberals* before the *Republicans*,—and now the *Republicans* tremble before the *Socialists*." This newspaper extract was appended as an epigraph to an English translation of one of Marx's articles on the June Days uprising; see Dr. Marx, "June 29, 1848," *Notes to the People*, no. 16 (16 August 1851), 312.

underappreciated role in Marx's constitutional thought.) Before the transformations brought about by the 1848 Revolutions, conservatives could look to the absolute monarchies in Prussia, Austria, and Russia; liberals took inspiration from the constitutional regimes in Britain, France, and various southern German states, while republicans were left with the memory of the First French Republic and the ambiguous example of the American Republic.[124] At

124. The nineteenth-century Latin American and Caribbean republics played less of a role in the European republican imagination (though the question would deserve greater study). For an interesting account of the influence in the 1820s of the Haitian republic on British

the two extremes, absolute monarchy meant individual rule by the sovereign unconstrained by a constitution or an effective legislature, while a democratic republic implied not simply the removal of the monarch but a constitution that enshrined equal civic rights and democratic popular sovereignty. Constitutional monarchy, on the other hand, was considered (by its supporters and detractors) to be a compromise or halfway house, in which the monarch's power was checked by a constitution, civic rights were introduced but heavily circumscribed, and popular rule was avoided through a property franchise on elections to a lower house and the balancing power of an (often unelected) upper house of notables.[125] (Constitutional monarchy in the nineteenth century thus differed from its usual contemporary connotation of a representative democracy that happens to have a hereditary monarch as the ceremonial head of state.) Republicans and liberals could thus form a limited alliance when it came to opposing absolute monarchy, but they disagreed on the regime that should replace it. Understanding the liberal antipathy to democracy in the nineteenth century is critical to understanding republicanism as a distinct political movement and not simply subsuming it under the liberal umbrella—an interpretive commonplace that has contributed to the erasure of nineteenth-century republicanism.

Republicanism in nineteenth-century Europe was thus centrally a political movement dedicated to the introduction of democracy and popular sovereignty. That meant not only a franchise free from property qualifications but extensive participation and popular control in representative government and public administration. Underlying and uniting those institutional aims was a distinctive conception of liberty, understood as the absence of arbitrary power or domination, where citizens had to collectively control the laws to which they were subject. That conception of liberty was not limited to the political sphere but also grounded republicans' social objection to the dependency of capitalist wage-labor. For the more radical and popular republicans, this arbitrary power had to be overcome by measures that universalized small-scale property ownership and secured the independence of self-employed artisans and peasants.[126]

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republicans like Richard Carlile, see James Forde, *The Early Haitian State and the Question of Political Legitimacy: American and British Representations of Haiti, 1804–1824* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 147–49, 173–82.

125. For a sense of these restrictions on civic rights, including press freedom and freedom of association, see Pamela Pilbeam, *The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814–1848* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 55–56, 60–65.

126. I provide some discussion of the liberal or bourgeois strains of republicanism in chapters 4 and 5 but focus less on them as they were not as distinct from liberalism and represented less of a competing threat to working class support for Marx's communism. For discussion of

## Marx in (and beyond) the Nineteenth Century

This book is written in the spirit that there is much to be gained from studying Marx's thought in its historical context. That means that the book devotes significant attention to reconstructing the social and political thought of Marx's contemporaries, through a close reading of their articles, speeches, and works, in order to bring to light the kind of political intervention Marx was trying to make with his work. While I do not think that this is the only way one can fruitfully engage with Marx's work, I do think it is a curiously underutilized approach (especially when compared with treatments of other canonized figures).[127] It is an especially important approach for the central question of this book, because it allows for the recovery of both republicans and antipolitical socialists as living competitors to Marx's communism. The vitality and the nature of their thought is easily occluded if one restricts oneself solely to Marx's own writings. Marx was never the most generous guide to the views he attempted to displace; nor did he, understandably, always explicitly signpost the views he was criticizing.

Reading the work of republicans is also critical to avoid simply transposing into the nineteenth century a conception of republicanism that has been shaped by twenty-first-century academic requirements or a reading of republicanism formed only by the Renaissance or Classical worlds.[128] Nineteenth-century republicanism is more interesting, varied, and surprising than such a transposition would allow for. I have thus tried to reconstruct republicanism as they saw it (without thereby limiting myself to their own assessment of their ideas). That has involved a study of the works of leading republican figures (such as Mazzini or Lamennais), as well as the manifestos, newspapers, and journals that built the wider movement and are critical to the reconstruction of any tradition of thought. Interspersed in the book are several in-depth intellectual and biographical portraits of republicans, including Karl Heinzen, William James Linton, and Arnold Ruge, whom I have chosen not only for their proximity to Marx (in the

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moderate and radical republicanism, see Samuel Hayat, *Quand la République était révolutionnaire: Citoyenneté et représentation en 1848* (Paris: Seuil 2014); for a lively portrait of Marie d'Agoult's moderate republicanism, see Jonathan Beecher, *Writers and Revolution: Intellectuals and the French Revolution of 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), chapter 4.

127. For a recent example of a noncontextual but highly stimulating reading of Marx, see Jan Kandiyali, "The Importance of Others: Marx on Unalienated Production," *Ethics* 130 (2020): 555–87. For a defense of contextualist approaches to Marx, see Terrell Carver, "Marx and the Politics of Sarcasm," *Socialism and Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2010): 102–18.

128. For the importance of this point in a different republican context, see Leigh Jenco, "What Is 'Republican' about Republican Chinese Thought (1895–1949)?," in *Republicanism in Northeast Asia*, ed. Jun-Hyeok Kwak and Leigh Jenco (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 85–108.

case of Heinzen and Ruge) or attempt to spell out a comprehensive republican political philosophy (as with Linton), but also to give a sense of how republicanism and the struggle for its ideals shaped the lives of its adherents.[129]

Given the value of studying Marx in his historical context, it is a shame that two of the most prominent recent biographies of Marx have given the impression that contextualizing Marx in the nineteenth century entails consigning him to it. Jonathan Sperber's and Gareth Stedman Jones's widely noted biographies have genuine merits, but they are motivated by that unfortunate assumption, having seemingly forgotten "that to historicize a subject is not to bury it."[130] In Stedman Jones's account, context often overshadows the focus on clarifying Marx's actual ideas and serves to suggest their seeming irrelevance to the modern world.[131] In Sperber's account this is explicit; he maintains that a contextual approach reveals Marx to be a "figure of a past historical epoch, one increasingly distant from our own . . . what Marx meant by 'capitalism' was not the contemporary version of it," and he claims that attempts to make his ideas relevant through contemporary ideas and theories are "singularly useless pastimes."[132] I share neither of these convictions. I think that concepts drawn from contemporary analytic political theory, for instance, can not only provide for productive modern reinterpretations of Marx but also, when applied carefully, help illuminate historical context by clarifying the nature of different political positions.[133] I have found the contemporary theoretical literature on freedom and domination especially helpful in this regard. I am, moreover, not convinced that the problems of the nineteenth century are as distant as Sperber assumes. Much has, of course, changed, but it is also "easy to be seduced by historical distance."[134]

129. For a sense of the risks and sacrifices made by republicans for their ideals, see, for instance, the revolutionary memoirs of [Emma Herwegh], *Zur Geschichte der deutschen demokratischen Legion aus Paris: Von einer Hochverräterin* (Grünberg: W. Levyson 1849); and Amalie Struve, *Erinnerungen aus den badischen Freiheitskämpfen* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1850).

130. Peter Ghosh, "Constructing Marx in the History of Ideas," *Global Intellectual History* 2, no. 2 (2017): 150. See similarly the criticism in David Harvey, *Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Reason* (London: Profile Books, 2017), xiii; Sven-Eric Liedman, *A World to Win: The Life and Works of Karl Marx* (London: Verso Books, 2018), x–xii.

131. See, for instance, Gareth Stedman Jones, *Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion* (London: Allen Lane, 2016), 135, 202–3, 234–35, 271, 429–30, 537–38. For critique, see David Leopold, "More Greatness than Illusion: Stedman Jones on Marx," *European Journal of Political Theory* 18, no. 1 (2019): 128–37.

132. Sperber, *Karl Marx*, xiii–xviii.

133. For a particularly successful combination of analytic and contextual methods, see Leopold, *Young Karl Marx*.

134. Gourevitch, *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth*, 174.

Tenacious struggle has in some places managed to ameliorate aspects of the social domination of capitalism that Marx critiqued. But it has neither disappeared nor have its essential contours been overcome.[135] If I thought that Marx had nothing to say about this, I would not have written this book.

To that end, I am attracted to a conception of contextualism that sees its task as the unearthing of the past in order to reevaluate present assumptions and refocus our future politics. In an appealing account of the contribution that intellectual history can make, Quentin Skinner depicts the historian of political thought as a "kind of archaeologist, bringing buried intellectual treasure back to the surface, dusting it down and enabling us to reconsider what we think of it."[136] Such an intellectual archaeology allows us to see that our current assumptions were not the only possibilities but rather one set among several possible paths that were not taken.[137] Deciding whether and how that intellectual treasure should inspire us to strike out on a new path is a further and necessary task. But by showing us the alternatives that existed behind us, the history of political thought can challenge us to see that they could also lie ahead. In the closing pages of the book, I suggest two such resources that might be drawn from the study of Marx and republicanism: first, reclaiming the idea that freedom lies at the heart of a social critique of capitalist domination and, second, that popular democratic institutions are essential to overcoming that domination. While I offer these possibilities, and aim to develop them in future work, I also hope that by placing Marx in his unfamiliar historical context, I can provide readers with an opportunity to draw out their own resources.

135. See for instance, Alex Gourevitch, "Bernie Sanders Was Right to Talk about Wage Slavery. We Should Talk About It, Too," *Jacobin*, 24 January 2020, https://jacobin.com/2020/01/wage-slavery-bernie-sanders-labor.

136. Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, 112.

137. Ibid., 116–17.